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Abstract
In response to the volume and sophistication of malicious software or malware, security investigators rely on dynamic
analysis for malware detection to thwart obfuscation and packing issues. Dynamic analysis is the process of executing
binary samples to produce reports that summarise their runtime behaviors. The investigator uses these reports to
detect malware and attribute threat type leveraging manually chosen features. However, the diversity of malware and
the execution environments makes manual approaches not scalable because the investigator needs to manually engineer
fingerprinting features for new environments. In this paper, we propose, MalDy (mal die), a portable (plug and play)
malware detection and family threat attribution framework using supervised machine learning techniques. The key
idea of MalDy of portability is the modeling of the behavioral reports into a sequence of words, along with advanced
natural language processing (NLP) and machine learning (ML) techniques for automatic engineering of relevant security
features to detect and attribute malware without the investigator intervention. More precisely, we propose to use
bag-of-words (BoW) NLP model to formulate the behavioral reports. Afterward, we build ML ensembles on top of
BoW features. We extensively evaluate MalDy on various datasets from different platforms (Android and Win32) and
execution environments. The evaluation shows the effectiveness and the portability MalDy across the spectrum of the
analyses and settings.
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1. Introduction
Malware investigation is an important and time con-
suming task for security investigators. The daily volume
of malware raises the automation necessity of the detec-
tion and threat attribution tasks. The diversity of plat-
forms and architectures makes the malware investigation
more challenging. The investigator has to deal with a va-
riety of malware scenarios from Win32 to Android. Also,
nowadays malware targets all CPU architectures from x86
to ARM and MIPS that heavily influence the binary struc-
ture. The diversity of malware adopts the need for portable
tools, methods, and techniques in the toolbox of the secu-
rity investigator for malware detection and threat attribu-
tion.
Binary code static analysis is a valuable tool to inves-
tigate malware in general. It has been used effectively and
efficiently in many solutions [9], [15], [24], [23], and [27] in
PC and Android realms. However, the use of static analy-
sis could be problematic on heavily obfuscated and custom
packed malware. Solutions, such as [15], address those is-
sues partially but they are platform/architecture depen-
dent and cover only simple evading techniques. On the
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other hand, the dynamic analysis solutions [36], [10], [37],
[8], [31], [18], [19], [17], [30], [16] show more robustness
to evading techniques such as obfuscation and packing.
Dynamic analysis’s main drawback is its hungry to com-
putation resources [34], [14]. Also, it may be blocked by
anti-emulation techniques, but this is less common com-
pared to the binary obfuscation and packing. For this
reason, dynamic (also behavioral) analysis is still the de-
fault choice and the first analysis for malware by security
companies.
The static and behavioral analyses are sources for se-
curity features, which the security investigator uses to de-
cide about the binary maliciousness. Manual inspection of
these features is a tedious task and could be automated us-
ing machine learning techniques. For this reason, the ma-
jority of the state-of-the-art malware detection solutions
use machine learning [27], [9]. We could classify these so-
lutions’ methodologies into supervised and unsupervised.
The supervised approach, such as [29] for Win32 and [38],
[13] for Android, is the most used in malware investigation
[28], [13]. The supervised machine learning process starts
by training a classification model on a train-set. After-
ward, we use this model on new samples in a production
environment. Second, the unsupervised approach, such
as [30], [22], [11], [20], [21], in which the authors cluster
the malware samples into groups based on their similarity.
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Unsupervised learning is more common in malware family
clustering [30], and it is less common in malware detection
[22].
In this paper, we focus on supervised machine learn-
ing techniques along with behavioral (dynamic or runtime)
analyses to investigate malicious software. Dynamic and
runtime analyses execute binary samples to collect their
behavioral reports. The dynamic analysis makes the exe-
cution in a sandbox environment (emulation) where mal-
ware detection is an off-line task. The runtime analysis is
the process of collecting behavioral reports from produc-
tion machines. The security practitioner aims to obtain
these reports to make an online malware checking without
disturbing the running system.
1.1. Problem Statement
The state-of-the-art solutions, such as in [13], [25], [32],
rely on manual security features investigation in the detec-
tion process. For example, StormDroid [13] used Sendsms
and Recvnet dynamic features, which have been chosen
base on a statistical analysis, for Android malware detec-
tion. Another example, the authors in [26] used explicit
features to build behavior’s graphs for Win32 malware de-
tection . The security features may change based on the
execution environment despite the targeted platform. For
instance, the authors [13] and [8] used different security
features due to the difference between the execution en-
vironments. In the context of the security investigation,
we are looking for a portable framework for malware de-
tection based on the behavioral reports across a variety
of platforms, architectures, and execution environments.
The security investigator would rely on this plug and play
framework with a minimum effort. We plug the behav-
ioral analysis reports for the training and apply (play) the
produced classification model on new reports (same type)
without an explicit security feature engineering as in [13],
[26], [12]; and this process works virtually on any behav-
ioral reports.
1.2. MalDy
We propose, MalDy, a portable and generic frame-
work for malware detection and family threat investigation
based on behavioral reports. MalDy aims to be a utility
on the security investigator toolbox to leverage existing
behavioral reports to build a malware investigation tool
without prior knowledge regarding the behavior model,
malware platform, architecture, or the execution environ-
ment. More precisely, MalDy is portable because of the
automatic mining of relevant security features to allow
moving MalDy to learn new environments’ behavioral re-
ports without a security expert intervention. Formally,
MalDy framework is built on top natural language pro-
cessing (NLP) modeling and supervised machine learning
techniques. The main idea is to formalize the behavioral
report, agnostically to the execution environment, into a
bag of words (BoW) where the features are the reports’
words. Afterward, we leverage machine learning tech-
niques to automatically discover relevant security features
that help differentiate and attribute malware. The result
is MalDy, portable (Section 8.2), effective (Section 8.1),
and efficient (Section 8.3) framework for malware investi-
gation.
1.3. Result Summary
We extensively evaluate MalDy on different datasets,
from various platforms, under multiple settings to show
the framework portability, effectiveness, efficiency, and its
suitability for general purpose malware investigation. First,
we experiment on Android malware behavioral reports of
MalGenome [39], Drebin [9], and Maldozer [24] datasets
along with benign samples from AndroZoo [7] and Play-
Drone 1 repositories. The reports were generated using
Droidbox [3] sandbox. MalDy achieved 99.61%, 99.62%,
93.39% f1-score on the detection task on the previous datasets
respectively. Second, we apply MalDy on behavioral re-
ports (20k samples from 15 Win32 malware family) pro-
vided by ThreatTrack security 2 (ThreatAnalyzer sand-
box). Again, MalDy shows high accuracy on the family at-
tribution task, 94.86% f1-score, under different evaluation
settings. Despite the difference between the evaluation
datasets, MalDy shows high effectiveness under the same
hyper-parameters with minimum overhead during the pro-
duction, only 0.03 seconds runtime per one behavioral re-
port on modern machines.
1.4. Contributions
• New Framework: We propose and explore a data-
driven approach to behavioral reports for malware
investigation (Section 5). We leverage a word-based
security feature engineering (Section 6) instead of
the manual specific security features to achieve high
portability across different malware platforms and
settings.
• BoW and ML: We design and implement the pro-
posed framework using the bag of words (BoW) model
(Section 5.4) and machine learning (ML) techniques
(Section 5.4). The design is inspired from NLP solu-
tions where the word frequency is the key for feature
engineering.
• Application and Evaluation: We utilize the pro-
posed framework for Android Malware detection us-
ing behavioral reports from DroidBox [3] sandbox
(Section 8). We extensively evaluate the framework
on large reference datasets namely, Malgenome [39],
Drebin [9], and Maldozer [24] (Section 7). To evalu-
ate the portability, we conduct a further evaluation
on Win32 Malware reports (Section 8.2) provided by
a third-party security company. MalDy shows high
accuracy in all the evaluation tasks.
1https://archive.org/details/android apps
2https://www.threattrack.com
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2. Threat Model
We position MalDy as a generic malware investigator
tool. MalDy current design considers only behavioral re-
ports. Therefore, MalDy is by design resilient to binary
code static analysis issues like packing, compression, and
dynamic loading. MalDy performance depends on the
quality of the collected reports. The more security in-
formation and features are provided about the malware
samples in the reports the higher MalDy could differen-
tiate malware from benign and attribute to known fam-
ilies. The execution time and the random event gener-
ator may have a considerable impact on MalDy because
they affect the quality of the behavioral reports. First,
the execution time affect the amount of information in the
reports. Therefore, small execution time may result lit-
tle information to fingerprint malware. Second, random
event generator may not produce the right events to trig-
ger certain malware behaviors; this loads to false negatives.
Anti-emulation techniques, used to evade Dynamic analy-
sis, could be problematic for MalDy framework. However,
this issue is related to the choice the underlying execu-
tion environment. First, this problem is less critical for a
runtime execution environment because we collect the be-
havioral reports from real machines (no emulation). This
scenario presumes that all the processes are benign and we
check for malicious behaviors. Second, the security practi-
tioner could replace the sandbox tool with a resilient alter-
native since MalDy is agnostic to the underlying execution
environment.
3. Overview
The execution of a binary sample (or app) produces
textual logs whether in a controlled environment (soft-
ware sandbox) or production ones. The logs, a sequence
of statements, are the result of the app events, this de-
pends on the granularity of the logs. Furthermore, each
statement is a sequence of words that give a more granular
description on the actual app event. From a security in-
vestigation perspective, the app behaviors are summarized
in an execution report, which is a sequence of statements
and each statement is a sequence of words. We argue that
malicious apps have distinguishable behaviors from benign
apps and this difference is translated into words in the be-
havioral report. Also, we argue that similar malicious apps
(same malware family) behaviors are translated to similar
words.
Nowadays, there are many software sandbox solutions
for malware investigations. CWSandbox (2006-2011) is
one of the first sandbox solutions for production use. Later,
CWSandbox becomes ThreatAnalyzer 3, owned by Threat-
Track Security. TheatAnalyzer is a sandbox system for
Win32 malware, and it produces behavioral reports that
3https://www.threattrack.com/malware-analysis.aspx
<open_key~key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\
Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers"/> <open_key
key="HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers"/> <open_key
key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\
Services\
LanmanWorkstation\NetworkProvider"/>
</registry_section> <process_section> <enum_processes
apifunction="Process32First" quantity="84"/> <
open_process targetpid="308"
desiredaccess="PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS
PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD
PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION
PROCESS_SET_INFORMATION
PROCESS_TERMINATE PROCESS_VM_OPERATION
PROCESS_VM_READ PROCESS_VM_WRITE
PROCESS_SET_SESSIONID PROCESS_SET_QUOTA SYNCHRONIZE"
apifunction="NtOpenProcess" successful="1"/>
Figure 1: Win32 Malware Behavioral Report Snippet (ThreatAna-
lyzer, www.threattrack.com)
"accessedfiles": { "1546331488": "/proc/1006/cmdline
","2044518634":
"/data/com.macte.JigsawPuzzle.Romantic/shared_prefs/
com.apperhand.global.xml",
"296117026":
"/data/com.macte.JigsawPuzzle.Romantic/shared_prefs/
com.apperhand.global.xml",
"592194838": "/data/data/com.km.installer/
shared_prefs/TimeInfo.xml",
"956474991": "/proc/992/cmdline"},"apkName": "
fe3a6f2d4c","closenet":
{},"cryptousage": {},"dataleaks": {},"dexclass": {
"0.2725639343261719": {
"path": "/data/app/com.km.installer-1.apk", "type
": "dexload"}
Figure 2: Android Malware Behavioral Report Snippet (DroidBox
[3])
cover most of the malware behavior aspects such as a
file, network, register access records. Figure 1 shows a
snippet from a behavioral report generated by Threat-
Analyzer. For android malware, we use DroidBox [3], a
well-established sandbox environment based on Android
software emulator [1] provided by Google Android SDK
[2]. Running an app may not lead to a sufficient cover-
age of the executed app. As such, to simulate the user
interaction with the apps, we leverage MonkeyRunner [4],
which produces random UI actions aiming for a broader ex-
ecution coverage. However, this makes the app execution
non-deterministic since MonkeyRunner generates random
actions. Figure 2 shows a snippet from the behavioral re-
port generated using DroidBox.
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<open_key~key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Micros
oft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Laye
rs"/> <open_key key="HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\M
icrosoft\Windows NT \CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlag
s\Layers"/> <open_key key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Sys
tem\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\
NetworkProvider"/> </registry_section>  <process_
section> <enum_processes apifunction="Process32Fi
rst" quantity="84"/> <open_process targetpid="308
" desiredaccess="PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS PROCESS_CREAT
E_PROCESS PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD PROCESS_DUP_HANDL
E PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION PROCESS_SET_INFORMATI
ON PROCESS_TERMINATE PROCESS_VM_OPERATION PROCESS
_VM_READ PROCESS_VM_WRITE PRO    CESS_SET_SESSION
ID PROCESS_SET_QUOTA SYNCHRONIZE" apifunction="Nt
OpenProcess" successful="1"/>
<open_key~key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Micros
oft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Laye
rs"/> <open_key key="HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\M
icrosoft\Windows NT \CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlag
s\Layers"/> <open_key key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Sys
tem\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\
NetworkProvider"/> </registry_section>  <process_
section> <enum_processes apifunction="Process32Fi
rst" quantity="84"/> <open_process targetpid="308
" desiredaccess="PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS PROCESS_CREAT
E_PROCESS PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD PROCESS_DUP_HANDL
E PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION PROCESS_SET_INFORMATI
ON PROCESS_TERMINATE PROCESS_VM_OPERATION PROCESS
_VM_READ PROCESS_VM_WRITE PRO    CESS_SET_SESSION
ID PROCESS_SET_QUOTA SYNCHRONIZE" apifunction="Nt
OpenProcess" successful="1"/>
<open_key~key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Micros
oft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Laye
rs"/> <open_key key="HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\M
icrosoft\Windows NT \CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlag
s\Layers"/> <open_key key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Sys
tem\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\
NetworkProvider"/> </registry_section>  <process_
section> <enum_processes apifunction="Process32Fi
rst" quantity="84"/> <open_process targetpid="308
" desiredaccess="PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS PROCESS_CREAT
E_PROCESS PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD PROCESS_DUP_HANDL
E PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION PROCESS_SET_INFORMATI
ON PROCESS_TERMINATE PROCESS_VM_OPERATION PROCESS
_VM_READ PROCESS_VM_WRITE PRO    CESS_SET_SESSION
ID PROCESS_SET_QUOTA SYNCHRONIZE" apifunction="Nt
OpenProcess" successful="1"/>
<open_key~key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Micros
oft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Laye
rs"/> <open_key key="HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\M
icrosoft\Windows NT \CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlag
s\Layers"/> <open_key key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Sys
tem\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\
NetworkProvider"/> </registry_section>  <process_
section> <enum_processes apifunction="Process32Fi
rst" quantity="84"/> <open_process targetpid="308
" desiredaccess="PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS PROCESS_CREAT
E_PROCESS PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD PROCESS_DUP_HANDL
E PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION PROCESS_SET_INFORMATI
ON PROCESS_TERMINATE PROCESS_VM_OPERATION PROCESS
_VM_READ PROCESS_VM_WRITE PRO    CESS_SET_SESSION
ID PROCESS_SET_QUOTA SYNCHRONIZE" apifunction="Nt
OpenProcess" successful="1"/>
<open_key~key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Micros
oft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Laye
rs"/> <open_key key="HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\M
icrosoft\Windows NT \CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlag
s\Layers"/> <open_key key="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Sys
tem\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\
NetworkProvider"/> </registry_section>  <process_
section> <enum_processes apifunction="Process32Fi
rst" quantity="84"/> <open_process targetpid="308
" desiredaccess="PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS PROCESS_CREAT
E_PROCESS PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD PROCESS_DUP_HANDL
E PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION PROCESS_SET_INFORMATI
ON PROCESS_TERMINATE PROCESS_VM_OPERATION PROCESS
_VM_READ PROCESS_VM_WRITE PRO    CESS_SET_SESSION
ID PROCESS_SET_QUOTA SYNCHRONIZE" apifunction="Nt
OpenProcess" successful="1"/>`
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Figure 3: MalDy Methodology Overview
4. Notation
• X = {Xbuild, Xtest} : X is the global dataset used
to build and report MalDy performance in the vari-
ous tasks. We use build set Xbuild to train and tune
the hyper-parameters of MalDy models. The test
set Xtest is use to measure the final performance of
MalDy, which is reported in the evaluation section.
X is divided randomly and equally to Xbuild (50%)
and Xtest (50%). To build the sub-datasets, we em-
ploy the stratified random split on the main dataset.
• Xbuild = {Xtrain, Xvalid} : Build set, Xbuild, is com-
posed of the train set and validation set and used to
build MalDy ensembles.
• mbuild = mtrain + mvalid : Build size is the total
number of reports used to build MalDy. The train
set takes 90% of the build set and the rest is used as
a validation set .
• Xtrain = {(x0, y0), (x1, y1), .., (xmtrain , ymtrain)} : The
train set, Xtrain, is the training dataset of MalDy
machine learning models.
• mtrain = |Xtrain| : The size of mtrain is the number
of reports in the train set.
• Xvalid = {((x0, y0), (x1, y1), .., (xmvalid , ymvalid)} : The
validation set, Xvalid, is the dataset used to tune the
trained model. We choose the hyper-parameters that
achieve the best scores on the validation set.
• mvalid = |Xvalid| : The size of mvalid is the number
of reports in the validation set.
• (xi, yi) : A single record in X is composed of a sin-
gle report xi and its label yi ∈ {+1,−1}. The label
meaning depends on the investigation task. In the
detection task, a positive means malware, and a neg-
ative means benign. In the family attribution task,
a positive means the sample is part of the current
model malware family and a negative is not.
• Xtest = {((x0, y0), (x1, y1), .., (xmtest , ymtest)} : We
use Xtest to compute and report back the final per-
formance results as presented in the evaluation sec-
tion (Section 8).
• mtest = |Xtest| : mtest is the size the Xtest and it
represent 50% of the global dataset X.
5. Methodology
In this section, we present the general approach of
MalDy as illustrated in Figure 3. The section describes the
approach based on the chronological order of the building
steps.
5.1. Behavioral Reports Generation
MalDy Framework starts from a dataset X of behav-
ioral reports with known labels. We consider two primary
sources for such reports based on the collection environ-
ment. First, We collect the reports from a software sand-
box environment [36], in which we execute the binary pro-
gram, malware or benign, in a controlled system (mostly
virtual machines). The main usage of sandboxing in secu-
rity investigation is to check and analyze the maliciousness
of programs. Second, we could collect the behavioral re-
ports from a production system in the form of system logs
of the running apps. The goal is to investigate the sanity
of the apps during the executions and there is no mali-
cious activity. As presented in Section 3, MalDy employs
a word-based approach to model the behavioral reports,
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but it is not clear yet how to use the report’s sequence of
words in MalDy Framework.
5.2. Report Vectorization
In this section, we answer the question: how can we
model the words in the behavioral report to fit in our clas-
sification component? Previous solutions [13] [30] select
specific features from the behavioral reports by: (i) ex-
tract relevant security features (ii) manually inspect and
select from these features [13]. This process involves man-
ual work from the security investigator. Also, it is not
scalable since the investigator needs to redo this process
manually for each new type of behavioral report. In other
words, we are looking for features (words in our case) rep-
resentation that makes an automatic feature engineering
without the intervention of a security expert. For this pur-
pose, MalDy proposes to employ Bag of Word (BoW) NLP
model. Specifically, we leverage term frequency-inverse
document frequency (TFIDF) [5] or feature hashing (trick)
(FH) [33]. MalDy has two variants based on the chosen
BoW technique whether TFIDF or FH. These techniques
generate fixed length vectors for the behavioral reports us-
ing words’ frequencies. TFIDF and FH are presented in
more detail in Section 6. At this point, we formulate the
reports into features vectors, and we are looking to build
classification models.
5.3. Build Models
MalDy framework utilizes a supervised machine learn-
ing to build its malware investigation models. To this
point, MalDy is composed of a set of models, each model
has a specific purpose. First, we have the threat detec-
tion model that finds out the maliciousness likelihood of
a given app from its behavioral report. Afterward, the
rest machine learning models aim to investigate individual
family threats separately. MalDy uses a model for each
possible threat that the investigator is checking for. In
our case, we have a malware detection model along with a
set of malware family attribution models. In this phase, we
build each model separately using Xbuild. All the models
are conducting a binary classification to provide the likeli-
hood of a specific threat. In the process of building MalDy
models, we evaluate different classification algorithms to
compare their performance. Furthermore, we tune up each
ML algorithm classification performance under an array of
hyper-parameters (different for each ML algorithm). The
latter is a completely automatic process; the investigator
only needs to provide Xbuild. We train each investigation
model on Xtrain and tune its performance on Xvalid by
finding the kptimum algorithm hyper-parameters as pre-
sented in Algorithm 1. Afterward, we determine the op-
timum decision threshold for each model using it perfor-
mance on Xvalid. At the ends this stage, we have list
of optimum models’ tuples Opt = {< c0, th0, params0 >
,< c1, th1, params1 >, .., < cc, thc, paramsc >}, the car-
dinality of list c is number of explored classification algo-
rithms. A tuple < ci, thi, paramsi > defines the optimum
hyper-parameters paramsi and decision threshold thi for
ML classification algorithm ci.
Algorithm 1: Build Models Algorithm
Input : Xbuild: build set
Output: Opt: optimum models’ tuples
1 Xtrain, Xvalid = Xbuild
2 for c in MLAlgorithms do
3 score = 0 for params in c.params array do
4 model = train(alg,Xtrain, params) ;
5 s, th = validate(model, Xvalid) ;
6 if s > score then
7 ct = < c, th, params > ;
8 end
9 end
10 Opt.add(ct)
11 end
12 return Opt
5.4. Ensemble Composition
Previously, we discuss the process of building and tun-
ning individual classification model for specific investiga-
tion tasks (malware detection, family one threat attribu-
tion, family two threat attribution, etc.). In this phase, we
construct an ensemble model (outperforms single models)
from a set of models generated using the optimum param-
eters computed previously (Section 5.3). We take each set
of optimally trained models {(C1, th1), (C2, th2), .., (Ch, thh)}
for a specific threat investigation task and unify them into
an ensemble E. The latter utilizes the majority voting
mechanism between the individual model’s outcomes for a
specific investigation task. Equation 1 shows the compu-
tation of the final outcome for one ensemble E, where wi
is the weight given for a single model. The current imple-
mentation gives equal weights for the ensemble’s models.
We consider exploring w variations for future work. This
phase produces MalDy ensembles, {E1Detection, E2Family1,
E3Family2 .., E
T
familyJ}, an ensemble for each threat and
the outcome is the likelihood this threat to be positive.
yˆ = E(x) = sign
 |E|∑
i
wiCi(x, thi)

=
{
+1 :
∑
i (wiCi)〉 = 0
−1 :∑i (wiCi)〈 0
(1)
5.4.1. Ensemble Prediction Process
MalDy prediction process is divided into two phases as
depicted in Algorithm 2. First, given a behavioral report,
we generate the feature vector x using TFIDF or FH vec-
torization techniques. Afterward, the detection ensemble
Edetection checks the maliciousness likelihood of the fea-
ture vector x. If the maliciousness detection is positive, we
proceed to the family threat attribution. Since the family
threat ensembles, {E2Family1, E3Family2 .., ETfamilyJ}, are
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independent, we compute the outcomes of each family en-
semble Efamilyi . MalDy flags a malware family threat if
and only if the majority voting is above a given voting
threshold vth (computed using Xvalid). In the case there
is no family threat flagged by the family ensembles, MalDy
will tag the current sample as an unknown threat. Also, in
the case of multiple families are flagged, MalDy will select
the family with the highest probability, and provide the se-
curity investigator with the flagged families sorted by the
likelihood probability. The separation between the family
attribution models makes MalDy more flexible to update.
Adding a new family threat will need only to train, tune,
and calibrate the family model without affecting the rest
of the framework ensembles.
Algorithm 2: Prediction Algorithm
Input : report: Report
Output: D: Decision
1 Edetection = E
1
Detection ;
2 Efamily = {E2Family1, .., ETfamilyJ} ;
3 x = Vectorize(report) ;
4 detection result = Edetection(x);
5 if detection result < 0 then
6 return detection result ;
7 end
8 for EFi in Efamily do
9 family result = EFi(x) ;
10 end
11 return detection result, family result ;
6. Framework
In this section, we present in more detail the key tech-
niques used in MalDy framework namely, n-grams [6], fea-
ture hashing (FH), and term frequency inverse document
frequency (TFIDF). Furthermore, we present the explored
and tuned machine learning algorithms during the models
building phase (Section 6.2).
6.1. Feature Engineering
In this section, we describe the components of the MalDy
related to the automatic security feature engineering pro-
cess.
6.1.1. Common N-Gram Analysis (CNG)
A key tool in MalDy feature engineering process is the
common N-gram analysis (CNG) [6] or simply N-gram. N-
gram tool has been extensively used in text analyses and
natural language processing in general and its applications
such as automatic text classification and authorship attri-
bution [6]. Simply, n-gram computes the contiguous se-
quences of n items from a large sequence. In the context of
MalDy, we compute word n-grams on behavioral reports
by counting the word sequences of size n. Notice that
the n-grams are extracted using a moving forward win-
dow (of size n) by one step and incrementing the counter
of the found feature (word sequence in the window) by
one. The window size n is a hyper-parameter in MalDy
framework. N-gram computation happens simultaneously
with the vectorization using FH or TFIDF in the form of
a pipeline to prevent computation and memory issues due
to the high dimensionality of the n-grams. From a secu-
rity investigation perspective, n-grams tool can produce
distinguishable features between the different variations of
an event log compared to single word (1-grams) features.
The performance of the malware investigation is highly
affected by the features generated using n-grams (where
n > 0). Based on BoW model, MalDy considers the count
of unique n-grams as features that will be leveraged by
through a pipeline to the FH or TFIDF.
6.1.2. Feature Hashing
The first approach to vectorize the behavioral reports
is to employ feature hashing (FH) [33] (also called hashing
trick) along with n-grams. Feature hashing is a machine
learning preprocessing technique for compacting an arbi-
trary number of features into a fixed-length feature vector.
The feature hashing algorithm, described in Algorithm 3,
takes as input the report N-grams generator and the tar-
get length L of the feature vector. The output is a feature
vector xi with a fixed size L. We normalize xi using the
euclidean norm (also called L2 norm). As shown in For-
mula 2, the euclidean norm is the square root of the sum
of the squared vector values.
L2Norm(x) = ‖x‖2 =
√
x21 + .. + x
2
n (2)
Algorithm 3: Feature Vector Computation
Input : X seq: Report Word Sequence,
L: Feature Vector Length
Output: FH: Feature Hashing Vector
1 ngrams = Ngram Generator(X seq);
2 FH = new feature vector[L];
3 for Item in ngrams do
4 H = hash(Item) ;
5 feature index = H mod L ;
6 FH[feature index] += 1 ;
7 end
8 // normalization
9 FH = FH / ‖FH‖2 ;
Previous researches [35, 33] have shown that the hash
kernel approximately preserves the vector distance. Also,
the computational cost incurred by using the hashing tech-
nique for reducing a dimensionality grows logarithmically
with the number of samples and groups. Furthermore, it
helps to control the length of the compressed vector in an
associated feature space. Algorithm 3 illustrates the over-
all process of computing the compacted feature vector.
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6.1.3. Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency
TFIDF [5] is the second possible approach for behav-
ioral reports vectorization that also leverages N-grams tool.
It is a well-known technique adopted in the fields of in-
formation retrieval (IR) and natural language processing
(NLP). It computes feature vectors of input behavioral re-
ports by considering the relative frequency of the n-grams
in the individual reports compared to the whole reports
dataset. Let D = {d1, d2, . . . , dn} be a set of behav-
ioral documents, where n is the number of reports, and
let d = {w1, w2, . . . , wm} be a report, where m is the num-
ber of n-grams in d. TFIDF of n-gram w and report d is
the product of term frequency of w in d and the inverse
document frequency of w, as shown in Formula 3. The
term frequency (Formula 4) is the occurrence number of w
in d. Finally, the inverse document frequency of w (For-
mula 5) represents the number of documents n divided by
the number of documents that contain w in the logarith-
mic form. Similarly to the feature hashing (Section 6.1.2),
we normalize the produced vector using L2 norm (see For-
mula 2. The computation of TFIDF is very scalable, which
enhance MalDy efficiency.
tf-idf(w, d) = tf(w, d)× idf(w) (3)
tf(w, d) = |wi ∈ d, d = {w1, w2, ...wn} : w = wi| (4)
idf(w) = log
|D|
1 + |d : w ∈ d| (5)
6.2. Machine Learning Algorithms
Table 1 shows the candidate machine learning classifi-
cation algorithms for MalDy framework. The candidates
represent the most used classification algorithms and come
from different learning categories such as tree-based. Also,
all these algorithms have efficient public implementations.
We chose to exclude the logistic regression from the can-
didate list due to the superiority of SVM in almost all
cases. KNN may consume a lot of memory resources dur-
ing the production because it needs all the training dataset
to be deployed in the production environment. However,
we keep KNN in MalDy candidate list because of its unique
fast update feature. Updating KNN in a production en-
vironment requires only update the train set, and we do
not need to retrain the model. This option could be very
helpful in certain malware investigation cases. Consider-
ing other ML classifiers is considered for future work design
and implementation.
7. Evaluation Datasets
Table 2 presents the different datasets used to evaluate
MalDy framework. We focus on the Android and Win32
platforms to prove the portability of MalDy, and other
Classifier Category Classifier Algorithm Chosen
CART 3
Tree Random Forest 3
Extremely Randomized Trees 3
General K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) 3
Support Vector Machine (SVM) 3
Logistic Regression 7
XGBoost 3
Table 1: Explored Machine Learning Classifiers
platforms are considered for a further future research. All
the used datasets are publicly available except the Win32
Malware dataset, which is provided by a third-party se-
curity vendor. The behavioral reports are generated us-
ing DroidBox [3] and ThreatAnalayzer 4 for Android and
Win32 respectively.
Platform Dataset Sandbox Tag #Sample/#Family
MalGenome [39] D Malware 1k/10
Android Drebin [9] D Malware 5k/10
Maldozer [24] D Malware 20k/20
AndroZoo [7] D Benign 15k/-
PlayDrone 5 D Benign 15k/-
Win32 Malware 6 T Malware 20k/15
Table 2: Evaluation Datasets. D: DroidBox, T: ThreatAnalyzer
8. MalDy Evaluation
In the section, we evaluate MalDy framework on differ-
ent datasets and various settings. Specifically, we question
the effectiveness of the word-based approach for malware
detection and family attribution on Android behavior re-
ports (Section 8.1). We verify the portability and MalDy
concept on other platforms (Win32 malware) behavioral
reports (Section 8.2). Finally, We measure the efficiency of
MalDy under different machine learning classifiers and vec-
torization techniques (Section 8.3). During the evaluation,
we answer some other questions related to the comparison
between the vectorization techniques (Section 8.1.2, and
the used classifiers in terms of effectiveness and efficiency
(Section 8.1.1). Also, we show the effect of train-set’s size
(Section 8.2.2) and the usage of machine learning ensemble
technique (Section 8.1.3) on the framework performance.
8.1. Effectiveness
The most important question in this research is: Can
MalDy framework detect malware and make family attri-
bution using a word-based model on behavioral reports?
In other words, how effective this approach? Figure 4
shows the detection and the attribution performance under
various settings and datasets. The settings are the used
classifiers in ML ensembles and their hyper-parameters, as
4threattrack.com
5https://archive.org/details/android apps
6https://threattrack.com/
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Figure 4: MalDy Effectiveness Performance
shown in Table 4. Figure 4(a) depicts the overall perfor-
mance of MalDy. In the detection, MalDy achieves 90%
f1-score (100% maximum and about 80% minimum) in
most cases. On the other hand, in the attribution task,
MalDy shows over 80% f1-score in the various settings.
More granular results for each dataset are shown in Fig-
ures 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d) for Malgenome [39], Drebin [9],
and Maldozer [24] datasets respectively. Notice that Fig-
ure 4(a) combines the performance of based (worst), tuned,
and ensemble models, and summaries the results in Table
3.
8.1.1. Classifier Effect
The results in Figure 5, Table 3, and the detailed Table
4 confirm the effectiveness of MalDy framework and its
word-based approach. Figure 5 presents the effectiveness
performance of MalDy using the different classifier for the
final ensemble models. Figure 5(a) shows the combined
performance of the detection and attribution in f1-score.
All the ensembles achieved a good f1-score, and XGBoost
ensemble shows the highest scores. Figure 5(b) confirms
the previous notes for the detection task. Also, Figure
5(c) presents the malware family attribution scores per
ML classifier. More details on the classifiers performance
is depicted in Table 4.
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Figure 5: MalDy Effectiveness per Machine Learning Classifier
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Detection (F1 %) Attribution (F1 %)
Base Tuned Ens Base Tuned Ens
General
mean 86.06 90.47 94.21 63.42 67.91 73.82
std 6.67 6.71 6.53 15.94 15.92 14.68
min 69.56 73.63 77.48 30.14 34.76 40.75
25% 83.58 88.14 90.97 50.90 55.58 69.07
50% 85.29 89.62 96.63 68.81 73.31 78.21
75% 91.94 96.50 99.58 73.60 78.07 84.52
max 92.81 97.63 100.0 86.09 90.41 93.78
Genome
mean 88.78 93.23 97.06 71.19 75.67 79.92
std 5.26 5.46 4.80 16.66 16.76 16.81
min 77.46 81.69 85.23 36.10 40.10 44.09
25% 85.21 89.48 97.43 72.36 77.03 81.47
50% 91.82 96.29 99.04 76.66 81.46 86.16
75% 92.13 96.68 99.71 80.72 84.82 88.61
max 92.81 97.63 100.0 86.09 90.41 93.78
Drebin
mean 88.92 93.34 97.18 65.97 70.37 76.47
std 4.93 4.83 4.65 9.23 9.14 9.82
min 78.36 83.35 85.37 47.75 52.40 55.10
25% 84.95 89.34 96.56 61.67 65.88 75.05
50% 91.60 95.86 99.47 69.62 74.30 80.16
75% 92.25 96.53 100.0 72.68 76.91 81.61
max 92.78 97.55 100.0 76.28 80.54 87.71
Maldozer
mean 80.48 84.85 88.38 53.11 57.68 65.06
std 6.22 6.20 5.95 16.03 15.99 13.22
min 69.56 73.63 77.48 30.14 34.76 40.75
25% 75.69 80.13 84.56 39.27 43.43 53.65
50% 84.20 88.68 91.58 56.62 61.03 71.65
75% 84.88 89.01 92.72 67.34 71.89 74.78
max 85.68 89.97 93.39 71.17 76.04 78.30
Table 3: Tuning Effect of Tuning of MalDy Performance
8.1.2. Vectorization Effect
Figure 6 shows the effect of vectorization techniques on
the detection and the attribution performance. Figure 6(a)
depict the overall combined performance under the vari-
ous settings. As depicted in Figure 6(a), Feature hashing
and TFIDF show a very similar performance. In detec-
tion task, the vectorization techniques’ f1-score is almost
identical as presented in Figure 6(b). We notice a higher
overall attribution score using TFIDF compared to FH, as
shown in Figure 6(c). However, we may have cases where
FH outperforms TFIDF. For instance, XGBoost achieved
a higher attribution score under the feature hashing vec-
torization, as shown in Table 4.
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Figure 6: MalDy Effectiveness per Vectorization Technique
8.1.3. Tuning Effect
Figure 7 illustrates the effect of tune and ensemble
phases on the overall performance of MalDy. In the de-
tection task, as in Figure 7(a), the ensemble improves the
performance by 10% f1-score over the base model. The
ensemble is composed of a set of tuned models that already
outperform the base model. In the attribution task, the
ensemble improves the f1-score by 9%, as shown in Figure
7(b).
8.2. Portability
In this section, we question the portability of the MalDy
by applying the framework on a new type of behavioral re-
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Settings Attribution F1-Score (%) Detection F1-Score (%)
Model Dataset Vector Base Tuned Ensemble Base Tuned Ensemble FPR(%)
CART Drebin Hashing 64.93 68.94 72.92 91.55 95.70 99.40 00.64
Drebin TFIDF 68.12 72.48 75.76 92.48 96.97 100.0 00.00
Genome Hashing 82.59 87.28 89.90 91.79 96.70 98.88 00.68
Genome TFIDF 86.09 90.41 93.78 92.25 96.50 100.0 00.00
Maldozer Hashing 33.65 38.56 40.75 82.59 87.18 90.00 06.92
Maldozer TFIDF 40.14 44.21 48.07 83.92 88.67 91.16 04.91
ETrees Drebin Hashing 72.84 77.27 80.41 91.65 95.77 99.54 00.23
Drebin TFIDF 71.12 76.12 78.13 92.78 97.55 100.0 00.00
Genome Hashing 74.41 79.20 81.63 91.91 96.68 99.14 00.16
Genome TFIDF 73.83 78.65 81.02 92.09 96.61 99.57 00.03
Maldozer Hashing 65.23 69.34 73.13 84.56 88.70 92.42 06.53
Maldozer TFIDF 67.14 71.85 74.42 84.84 88.94 92.74 06.41
KNN Drebin Hashing 47.75 52.40 55.10 78.36 83.35 85.37 12.86
Drebin TFIDF 51.87 56.53 59.20 82.48 86.57 90.40 05.83
Genome Hashing 36.10 40.10 44.09 77.46 81.69 85.23 07.01
Genome TFIDF 37.66 42.01 45.31 81.22 85.30 89.13 02.10
Maldozer Hashing 41.68 46.67 48.69 69.56 73.63 77.48 26.21
Maldozer TFIDF 48.02 52.73 55.31 70.94 75.36 78.51 03.86
RForest Drebin Hashing 72.63 76.80 80.46 91.54 95.95 99.12 00.99
Drebin TFIDF 72.15 76.40 79.91 92.31 96.62 100.0 00.00
Genome Hashing 78.92 83.73 86.12 91.37 95.79 98.95 00.68
Genome TFIDF 79.45 83.90 87.00 92.75 97.49 100.0 00.00
Maldozer Hashing 66.06 70.72 73.41 84.49 88.96 92.01 07.37
Maldozer TFIDF 67.96 72.04 75.89 85.07 89.41 92.72 06.10
SVM Drebin Hashing 57.35 61.95 82.92 84.50 89.33 96.08 00.86
Drebin TFIDF 63.11 67.19 87.71 85.11 89.35 96.73 01.15
Genome Hashing 69.99 74.68 86.08 85.47 89.83 96.54 00.19
Genome TFIDF 73.16 77.82 86.20 84.46 88.46 97.73 00.39
Maldozer Hashing 30.14 34.76 65.76 72.32 77.12 81.88 15.82
Maldozer TFIDF 36.69 41.09 70.18 76.82 81.14 85.46 08.56
XGBoost Drebin Hashing 76.28 80.54 84.01 92.05 96.50 99.61 00.29
Drebin TFIDF 73.53 77.88 81.18 92.23 96.45 100.0 00.00
Genome Hashing 81.80 85.84 89.75 91.86 96.09 99.62 00.32
Genome TFIDF 80.36 84.48 88.24 92.81 97.63 100.0 00.00
Maldozer Hashing 71.17 76.04 78.30 85.68 89.97 93.39 05.86
Maldozer TFIDF 69.51 74.15 76.87 85.01 89.16 92.86 06.05
Table 4: Android Malware Detection
ports (Section 8.2.1). Also, we investigate the appropriate
train-set size for MalDy to achieve a good results (Sec-
tion 8.2.2). We reports only the results the attribution
task on Win32 malware because we lack Win32 a benign
behavioral reports dataset.
8.2.1. MalDy on Win32 Malware
Table 5 presents MalDy attribution performance in
terms of f1-score. In contrast with previous results, we
trains MalDy models on only 2k (10%) out of 20k reports’
dataset (Table 2). The rest of the reports have been used
for testing (18k reports, or 80%). Despite that, MalDy
achieved high scores that reaches 95%. The results in Ta-
ble 5 illustrate the portability of MalDy which increases
the utility of our framework across the different platforms
and environments.
Model Ensemble F1-Score(%)
Hashing TFIDF
CART 82.35 82.74
ETrees 92.62 92.67
KNN 76.48 80.90
RForest 91.90 92.74
SVM 91.97 91.26
XGBoost 94.86 95.43
Table 5: MalDy Performance on Win32 Malware Behavioral Report
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Figure 7: Effect of MalDy Ensemble and Tunning on the Performance
8.2.2. MalDy Train Dataset Size
Using Win32 malware dataset (Table 5), we investigate
the train-set size hyper-parameter for Maldy to achieve
good results. Figure 8 exhibits the outcome of our analysis
for both vectorization techniques and the different classi-
fiers. We notice the high scores of MalDy even with rel-
atively small datasets. The latter is very clear if MalDy
uses SVM ensemble, in which it achieved 87% f1-score with
only 200 training samples.
8.3. Efficiency
Figure 8.3 illustrates the efficiency of MalDy by show-
ing the average runtime require to investigate a behavioral
report. The runtime is composed of the preprocessing time
and the prediction time. As depicted in Figure 8.3, MalDy
needs only about 0.03 second for a given report for all the
ensembles and the preprocessing settings except for SVM
ensemble. The latter requires from 0.2 to 0.5 seconds (de-
pend on the preprocessing technique) to decide about a
given report. Although SVM ensemble needs a small train-
set to achieve good results (see Section 8.2.2), it is very
expensive in production in terms of runtime. Therefore,
the security investigator could customize MalDy frame-
work to suite particular cases priorities. The efficiency ex-
periments have been conducted on Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
E52630 (128G RAM), we used only one CPU core.
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Figure 9: MalDy Efficiency
9. Conclusion, Limitation, and Future Work
The daily number of malware, that target the well-
being of the cyberspace, is increasing exponentially, which
11
overwhelms the security investigators. Furthermore, the
diversity of the targeted platforms and architectures com-
pounds the problem by opening new dimensions to the
investigation. Behavioral analysis is an important inves-
tigation tool to analyze the binary sample and produce
behavioral reports. In this work, we propose a portable,
effective, and yet efficient investigation framework for mal-
ware detection and family attribution. The key concept is
to model the behavioral reports using the bag of words
model. Afterwards, we leverage advanced NLP and ML
techniques to build discriminative machine learning en-
sembles. MalDy achieves over 94% f1-score in Android de-
tection task on Malgenome, Drebin, and MalDozer datasets
and more than 90% in the attribution task. We prove
MalDy portability by applying the framework on Win32
malware reports where the framework achieved 94% on the
attribution task. MalDy performance depends to the ex-
ecution environment reporting system and the quality of
the reporting affects its performance. In the current de-
sign, MalDy is not able to measure this quality to help the
investigator choosing the optimum execution environment.
We consider solving this issue for future research.
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